Leading from the Kantei: Japan and the Quad – Tokyo Review

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On Tuesday, October 6, Japan will be hosting the second Australia-India-Japan-U.S. quad foreign ministers meeting in Tokyo against the backdrop of rapidly changing geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. The quadrilateral strategic dialogue also known as QSD or Quad started as an ambiguous discussion on the international order launched by Abe Shinzo during his first premiership in 2007 convening major regional allies India, Australia and the United States. However, rather than the Japan-led initiative being driven in reaction to Chinas regional assertiveness, U.S. retrenchment, or even by Japans influential bureaucracy, it is has much more to do with the office of the prime minister, or the Kantei. Since this institutionalized executive branch takes the lead in foreign policy formulation in Japan, Abes Kantei-led diplomacy was arguably what enabled Japan to pursue the Quad.

Abe formed the Quads first informal grouping in May 2007 and it followed after former Abe administration foreign minister Aso Taros Arc of Freedom and Prosperity speech in November 2006 which focused on values-oriented diplomacy and the rule of law while excluding mention of China. As a result, the new Quad grouping quickly came to be viewed as a strong anti-China frontline, despite the considerable political ambiguity from Japan around what this grouping actually meant to achieve. By September 2007 Abe had stepped down as Japans prime minister due to health problems and by early 2008 Abes unfinished Quad forum had disbanded partially due to Indias and Australias reluctance, but also due to pressure from China. Abes replacement, Fukuda Yasuo, with his pro-China tilt ensured there was no talk of the Quad, and by the time the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) swept into power in 2009, the Quad or any possibility of a Quad-like concept had lost traction.

The Quad discussion forum has made a come back but explaining its rise and fall and its rise again is more counterintuitive than might be expected. First, if the Quad was simply a reaction to the geopolitical context, it does not explain why Fukuda had predispositions to Beijing while Aso did not, and Aso was unsuccessful when he again tried to promote his Arc conceptualization. Secondly, while the Democratic Party of Japans (DPJ) tenure has often been accused of leaning towards a pro- China shift, Stanford Universitys Danial Sneider convincingly argued that the DPJs new Asianism was actually an effort to manage the rise of China rather than accommodate it, demonstrating that the DPJ shared the same strategic unease about the changing balance of power as policymakers in the LDP. Both Hatoyama Yukios and Kan Naotos administrations also actively courted India, Australia, and Vietnam on various military and security initiatives. So why didnt the DPJ advance the Quad, or their own alternative of it, given that the 2010 Senkaku Islands incident precipitated a very serious crisis in Japans relations with China?

The answer is found in the Kantei. Both LDP and DPJ leadership between 2006-2012 simply did not have a Kantei that was sufficiently capable and well-staffed to lead such an initiative or any variant of it. Unlike Koizumi, who had successfully led from the Kantei, the first Abe administration, alongside Fukudas and Asos premierships all stumbled in key areas related to the Kantei and its key personalized appointments (the Cabinet Secretariat, cabinet appointments, and unofficial staff). The DPJ was also unable to lead from the Kantei, with Hatoyama taking a strong anti-bureaucratic stance upon becoming prime minister while also aiming to empower the executive branch. This move greatly undermined his relationship with the bureaucracy and fractured a key source of organizational support.

Upon Abes return to premiership in 2012, there was a renewed Japanese embrace of the Quad and greater clarity on the Quad concept. Abes 2012 essay titled Asias Democratic Security Diamond portrayed a Japan that was willing to be less coy about its motivations this time round. Indeed, from 2017 onwards, the group has met five times, even holding ministerial level talks in New York in 2019. Not only is this a change from Abes predecessors, but the shift towards emphasizing an apparent anti-China grouping also occurred amidst a rapprochement or reset in Japans relations with China, with Abes historic 2018 visit to Beijing.

Upon Abes return to premiership in 2012, there was a renewed Japanese embrace of the Quad and greater clarity on the Quad concept

While external factors such as Chinas continued aggressiveness in the East and South China Seas and U.S. unpredictability under the Trump administration have of course been a part of shaping Japans foreign policies, Japans approaches to them have in no way been the reactive of passive stereotypes that have frequently characterized Japanese foreign policy for decades. In fact, Japan has been markedly proactive and calculated, primarily because Abe has been able to lead from the Kantei.

Upon returning to office in 2012, Abe immediately significantly expanded the Kantei. He distributed key positions to very close and trusted aides, and this politicization and personalization of key appointments became a key characteristic of the Abe Kantei. He then appointed cabinet ministers that bridged the Kantei and the bureaucracy to help ensure that the bureaucracy remained in the Kanteis grip. By appointing Yachi Shotaro as secretary general of the newly-formed National Security Secretariat (NSS), Abe elevated a very important figure in the conceptualization of Asos Arc and Abes Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

These moves allowed Abe to deal with Japans infamous bureaucratic infighting and other disagreements among policy elites, such as those between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) regarding Chinas Belt-and-Road Initiative or the Northern Territories negotiations with Russia. It also helped Japan pursue security issues such as the Quad while also continuing to build economic ties with China through Seikei Bunri Japans old policy of separating economic and political issues. In effect, this allowed Abe to be successful in responding or overriding both domestic and systemic structures and gave his Kantei the ability to pragmatically maneuver and control the internal policy formulation process, all while dealing with external pressures.

But with the beginning of Sugas premiership, the question is whether Suga will be able to lead from the Kantei as his immediate predecessor did. On the first day as prime minister Suga tweeted he is determined to tear down bureaucratic sectionalismand also give birth to a cabinet that works for the people.

The Suga administration has been branded as a continuation cabinet given his role as Chief Cabinet Secretary and Abes right hand man for almost 8 years. But as Suga an independent of any LDP faction it means that the dynamics in the personalization and politicization of appointments will be slightly different than those of his predecessors. It was the China-friendly LDP Secretary General Nikai Toshihiro that lobbied the main LDP factions to support Sugas election bid which could very well mean China will continue to get a prominent push from the party.

But as Suga an independent of an LDP faction it means that the dynamics in the personalization and politicization of appointments will be slightly different than those of his predecessors

Additionally, while Suga will likely rely heavily on an experienced Motegi as Foreign Minister, Sugas replacement of Kono Taro with Kishii Nobuo as Minister of Defense has raised eyebrows. At a time when the party will need a voice to advance a new National Security Strategy, along with policies related to strike capabilities and agreements that would formalize security partnerships with countries like Australia and India, an appointment made for possible reasons of factional influence or personal favors could backfire for Suga.

On the other hand, Sugas Kantei is already showing signs of proactive pragmatism in balancing complex internal dynamics with structural external pressures similar to that which Abe showed in the latter half of his second administration. Motegi is reportedly scheduling a potential visit of Chinas Foreign Minister Wang Yi Wang for as early as October 2020, and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison plans on traveling to Japan to meet Suga as early as November.

Sugas Kantei is already showing signs of proactive pragmatism in balancing complex internal dynamics with external pressures

The Quad will certainly have a full agenda when it meets, though it does not have an explicit military dimension or even a formal institutional structure. Before Abes resignation, the Quad members had already started to focus on supply chain resilience, with Australia, Japan, and India, launching a special initiative around the beginning of August 2020 against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic and Chinas controversial moves toward Taiwan and Hong Kong. What also remains striking about the Quad is that it has resisted openly identifying China as the primary target it seeks to rein in.

These are just an outline of the broader issues Suga will have to grapple with in terms of working with their respective Quad partner states. But understanding whether Sugas Kantei will be successful in leading the Quad to coordinate its response to these latest challenges means understanding the changing landscape of Japans deeply complex internal foreign policy formulation apparatus, and not just its external environment.

Vindu Mai Chotani is a PhD student at the University of Tokyo's Graduate School of Public Policy. Her dissertation focuses on Abes Kantei Diplomacy, while her broader research examines Japanese foreign policy, India-Japan relations, and the evolving security architecture of the Indo-Pacific.

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Leading from the Kantei: Japan and the Quad - Tokyo Review